I saw this online today about a protest by some Pakistani-Americans in Chicago and am posting for your consumption. I noticed that Teeth Maestro had commented on this article on the original site, but I was shocked at some of the hatred that people show towards Pakistan.

A group of Pakistani-Americans and anti-war activists delivered a letter today to the Chicago office of Democratic presidential candidate Sen. Barack Obama, calling on him to cool political rhetoric about bombing targets in Pakistan.

“We are particularly concerned with your public pronouncements earlier this week in support of violating the borders of our ally, the country of Pakistan…,” the letter says. “You must understand the sweeping dismay that your avowed support for U.S. military incursions into Pakistan … has elicited among untold numbers of Pakistani-Americans and peace activists across the country.”

Ifti Nasim, the host of a Pakistani radio show in Chicago called Sargam, said the U.S. was “making a mistake” by “attacking Pakistan and making Pakistan your enemy.”

He and other protesters criticized U.S. military incursions into Pakistan’s tribal areas in the northwest part of the country to attack Taliban and Al Qaeda targets. They also decried the Bush administration’s use of unmanned military drone aircraft, which has resulted in civilian deaths.

Said Umar Khan said his hometown of Mardan outside Peshawar in Pakistan’s troubled North-West Frontier Province has seen a wave of displaced people escaping fighting in the tribal areas. A recent explosion rocked his sister’s home, damaging windows and walls, he said.

Negotiations with Taliban leaders–not Pakistani or U.S. military actions–will end the violence, Khan said.

The tough rhetoric against Pakistan in the presidential campaign has left many Pakistani-Americans wondering which candidate to support.

“McCain and Obama are the same,” said Raja M. Yaqub, chairman of the Coalition of Pakistani Organizations in Chicago. “Muslims and Pakistani Americans are confused over who they should vote for.”

On Thursday, Obama campaign officials restated his comments from the debate earlier this week. They added that Obama understands Pakistan is an “important ally” and is also calling for a partnership with the South Asian nation through increased U.S. aid for health, education and security.

When you read the comments, there is a vicious strain of “kill of the Pakistanis” in the thread. Many wanted to bomb Pakistan until we “hand over bin Laden,” like we have him under military protection. Another said that “if you don’t want us to cross your borders, don’t be a haven for terrorists,” interesting coming from a country that hid behind the Pakistan Army and the Mujahideen against the Soviet Army. The resounding call for US-based Pakistanis (legal and illegal) to go back to their home country was my favorite.

When the first Gulf War happened, I was living in the US and one of these illiterate, unplanned pregnancies walked up to me and told me the same. My answer, “I’m Pakistani, not Iraqi, you dumb shit.”

My answer to you today, “I’m a Pakistani, not a Terrorist, you stupid shit.”

Here’s what I don’t understand… on one hand that don’t know why there is so much anti-American sentiment in Pakistan and on the other hand, they hate us so much that they want to bomb our country until they prove that they were wrong about bin Laden being in Pakistan. 

But let’s be honest, the US military is already negotiating its exit strategy from Afghanistan by re-installing the Taliban as part of the government. And even then negotiating through the Saudis. 

So tell me this, since its the Taliban, and not Pakistan, that has given Osama bin Laden a home and protection for so many years, does anyone in the US think that once you broker a power sharing deal with them, they will hand him over? Are you really that stupid?

Otherwise, what would be the reason to broker a peace deal with the people that had a hand in the planning and attack on 9/11 without getting bin Laden or any other high value al-Qaeda target?

Karzai may be a US puppet, I guarantee the Taliban is not.

Source: Chicago Breaking News

Related posts:

1. The Long Road to Chaos in Pakistan Hours after a truck bomber slew 53 people last weekend...
2. Bush Had No Plan to Catch Osama bin Laden This month's Economist announces the Terrorism Index for 2008, in...
3. Say It Ain’t So Nic Robertson - Part I This is the first part of a review of Nic...

As the United States steps up border raids into Pakistan, troops from both countries have commenced a deadly game of brinksmanship. Although aimed at asserting each other’s military presence along the Pakistan-Afghan border, the skirmishes risk outright hostilities.

U.S. strikes in Pakistan are nothing new. Washington has conducted unilateral missile strikes since soon after its invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. American pilotless surveillance planes have been flying over the restive border with near impunity for much the same time.

From Air to Ground

But the tone of the U.S. presence changed this year. In July, President George W. Bush approved covert ground raids into suspected militant hideouts in the Waziristan region of Pakistan, much of which is a Taliban stronghold. Militants use the region as a sanctuary from which to strike foreign and Afghan troops in neighboring Afghanistan. Thus far, U.S. forces attempted at least three ground assaults. The only confirmed ground invasion of Pakistan, on September 3, led to the deaths of around 20 civilians, including women and children. No militant leaders were believed captured or killed in the raid.

This ground assault led to unprecedented rhetoric from Pakistan condemning the United States. Even Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, normally quite evasive with the media, said that the Army would defend Pakistan’s territory. The Pakistani government summoned the U.S. ambassador to the foreign office and blocked NATO supplies vital to the multinational force’s continued operation in Afghanistan.

Pakistan averted two other attempted ground raids when its border forces fired warning shots at U.S. helicopters ferrying commandos into Waziristan. On the most recent occasion, Pakistan and U.S. troops exchanged fire for five minutes. Pakistan’s government later claimed that its army fired flares, not bullets, at the helicopters, but this explanation did not sound very convincing.

Ostensibly, Washington fears that Waziristan - and other tribal regions - could become a staging area for further attacks on the United States if the Pakistani army doesn’t root out pro-Taliban forces. But Washington doubts whether Islamabad is capable of doing the job.

More broadly, U.S. policy in the region is increasingly shaped by its failure to establish unequivocal dominance in Iraq. With the War on Terror overshadowing U.S. foreign policy for the foreseeable future, the next U.S. president will have to deliver victory in some form to a skeptical public. That is the ultimate legacy of the September 11 hijackers, and the Bush administration.

The Next Target

That victory will most likely not come out of the violence and political mess of Iraq. Although the Bush administration and both presidential candidates support a significant, continued military presence in Iraq, the United States has accepted that it can’t control the entire country by direct military force. It may have had some success in marginalizing al-Qaeda in Iraq - after initially spurring its growth - but it has also been forced to accept Shia domination of domestic politics.

Iran was seriously mooted as the next frontline and even now experiences tremendous diplomatic pressure from Washington. But it’s difficult for the United States to promote the Shia state as the next front in the War on Terror, however much Israel or its lobby in the United States may favor this path. Iran doesn’t pose an immediate threat, nor would it afford a quick and easy military campaign. Rather, war with Iran would almost certainly lead to a severe disruption of global energy supplies and the world economy.

Pakistan, in comparison, is an irresistible target. The United States claims to have evidence that the government supports jihadis that wage war against the United States and NATO in Afghanistan. Even a limited, covert war, directed at militants, not the Pakistan Army, is arguably the easiest sell the United States has ever had to make since the 1990 war with Iraq. The only factor preventing all-out conflict is Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

Escalation

U.S. raids and missile strikes may be an attempt to see how far it can go with Pakistan. After Pervez Musharraf stepped down as president, the United States felt uninhibited by the concern that its Pakistan interventions were impairing a staunch ally. There have been as many missile strikes this year as in the previous seven.

Pakistan has engaged in loud rhetoric decrying the attacks and asserted it won’t tolerate intrusions into its territory. Strong public criticism was inevitable to placate a population deeply resentful of the U.S. presence in the region. Both civilian and military leaders have to guard against forces, such as rival politicians or upstart officers, using the crisis to leverage power.

Even internationally, if Pakistan hadn’t condemned the U.S. attacks, it would have tacitly acknowledged that it can’t address the militant problem on its own. That would be an open invitation to more interference from foreign armies and, potentially down the road, international isolation as a failed state.

Pakistan, as it currently exists, relies on U.S. patronage for its survival. There’s very little it can do if the United States decides to step up its military presence in Pakistan. According to the State Department, the United States has given Pakistan $2.4 billion in “security assistance” and $3.4 billion in economic assistance over the past seven years. Pakistan has obtained a raft of loans and credits from international financial institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank since its rehabilitation by the United States after September 11.

Despite the cold-headed realism, there’s a real danger that future confrontations between Pakistan and U.S. troops could escalate into outright hostilities. The Pakistani army’s rank-and-file is deeply uneasy about military operations that have killed several thousand fellow citizens and Muslims at the behest of Washington, not Islamabad. Pakistan border posts may welcome any future U.S. intrusion into Pakistan as an opportunity to assert their country’s independence.

U.S. and NATO commanders in Afghanistan also resent what they see as Pakistan’s unwillingness to stop militants from attacking their troops from hideouts in Pakistan. U.S. Marine Gen. James E. Cartwright recently told Congress that 30-40% of the attacks in Afghanistan come from Pakistan, an increasing proportion. American commanders may not need much persuasion to fire on Pakistani forces if they are seen to be getting in the way of militant targets. Even a standoff could accidentally escalate into all-out hostilities.

If substantial casualties ensue, Islamabad and Washington might be hard-pressed to soothe popular calls for revenge.

Courtesy: Toward Freedom

Related posts:

1. Gen. David Petraeus: Pakistan Faces Threat to Existence LONDON - U.S. Gen. David Petraeus warned Monday that combat...
2. Bush Had No Plan to Catch Osama bin Laden This month's Economist announces the Terrorism Index for 2008, in...
3. If Only The Roles Reversed - Pakistan Invades America I spotted this online today and thought... if only the...

The Economist has asked a very interesting question of 5 Pakistani experts. The question:

“Seven years after 9/11, Osama bin Laden remains as elusive as ever. Most analysts believe the al-Qaeda leader is hiding out in Pakistan’s tribal areas, along the border with Afghanistan. How do we catch him?”

Get Some Intelligence - Shuja Nawaz
Shuja Nawaz is a veteran journalist, analyst, and author of the recently released Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford University Press, 2008).

Osama bin Laden needs an extensive logistics network to stay active and in touch with his followers, and that presents an opportunity. Here’s how I’d catch him.

Penetrate his network through double agents—locals and Arabs who could slowly work their way into al Qaeda’s logistics chain. Over time, they could help map his activities and likely movements. Bin Laden cannot move easily without a sizable group of followers, so watch for the double-cab pickups that traverse the mountainous, wooded terrain of the northern Hindu Kush, his most likely hide-out. Look in Dir and Chitral districts, plus the contiguous Afghan provinces across the border. Bin Laden is not likely to settle in the more open, vegetation-free zone further south. Inventory the hujras or meeting houses that have been hired by foreigners through local Taliban and other sympathizers (bribes will get you everywhere in the tribal areas, so use cash to find out what you need to know). Taliban leaders use satellite phones, which are easy to track. Thurayas are the preferred brand, and there’s even a shop in Peshawar that sells them.

The United States and Pakistan must operate independently to prevent leaks. Organize the Pakistani cell as a fresh unit, using carefully screened Afghan and frontier experts from Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence. Link them to a small team of commandos tasked solely with ferreting out the al Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Locate the team inside Pakistani Army headquarters to avoid any leaks from ISI, and support it with a technology crew that can track electronic communications. Equip the commandos with fast-moving Apache and Mi-17 helicopters for rapid response. They’ll need the latest night-vision goggles, not the obsolete models that the United States currently supplies.

Above all, avoid collateral damage. As Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, recently told an interviewer, “I traveled three months to recruit and only got 10-15 persons. One bombing by the Americans that killed innocents, and I got hundreds of recruits!”

Partner with Pakistan - Lt. Gen. Talat Masood (Ret.)
Lt. Gen. Talat Masood is a retired general of the Pakistani Army.

The Bush administration is looking for illusive, quick results when a long-term perspective is crucial for success. Frequent U.S. airstrikes by drones in Pakistan’s tribal belt and the recent limited land operation in South Waziristan by U.S. forces have sparked anger throughout the country. Outraged moderates are joining hands with religious parties, asking the government to review Pakistan’s alliance in the war on terror. The government will resist such pressure, but it will be hard to pacify the public if these strikes escalate.

Indeed, the Taliban and al Qaeda would like nothing more than to fight the Americans on Pakistani soil, giving the impression that they are resisting foreign aggression. It would be extremely politically difficult for the Pakistani military to continue counterinsurgency operations if the United States sent in ground troops.

The United States needs to face the fact that it will not capture Osama bin Laden without Pakistan’s help. If U.S. policymakers have misgivings about elements of the ISI or other intelligence agencies, now is the time to address them, given that Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, the Army chief of staff, and the present civilian government are serious about fighting terrorism and militancy.

Working through the tribes is the best approach. Bin Laden is most likely surrounded by several rings of security personnel who are extremely loyal, heavily armed, and constantly on the move. By relying on human intelligence supplemented by technical intelligence, it should be possible to identify his general location. Gathering information from the people will not be easy, however, as they fear reprisal from the militants. The Taliban and al Qaeda’s second- and third-tier leadership under detention is another valuable source of intelligence. Capturing pro al-Qaeda warlords can help, as they have considerable knowledge about the location and movement of top leaders.

Today, bin Laden is a source of inspiration for Islamist radicals, not an operational commander. Thus, although his capture may be an important symbolic victory, it will not be a strategic defeat for al Qaeda or the Taliban. But the United States will not accomplish either symbolic or strategic victories against its enemy unless it has Pakistan as a partner.

Help the Pashtuns - Rahimullah Yusufzai
Rahimullah Yusufzai is resident editor of The News International, a daily newspaper in Peshawar.

To kill or capture Osama bin Laden, the United States will above all need to win friends and allies in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Unfortunately, U.S. policies are doing precisely the opposite.

Errant airstrikes and cross-border raids that have killed innocent civilians have made a bitter enemy out of the Pashtuns, who live on both sides of the Durand Line and make up the bulk of the Taliban. The Pashtun people are unusual in the sense that they would be willing to do things willingly if asked respectfully, but refuse point-blank if ordered to do so or threatened with force. Bombings and missile strikes won’t force them to beg for mercy or cooperate with the attackers. They are made of sterner stuff. Their patience is endless and is born out by their suffering during the past three decades.

To earn the Pashtuns’ goodwill and support, the United States and its allies will need to detach them from the Taliban and, in turn, detach the Taliban from al Qaeda. Lumping them together allows them to unite to fight a common enemy. But the Taliban and al Qaeda are different entities with separate agendas and, therefore, must be dealt with differently. Once that is done, bin Laden and other foreigners will find it hard to claim local support and seek sanctuary among the Pashtuns.

How can the United States win them over? One major source of Pashtun rage is the insecurity and killings in their areas, which prevent new jobs and development. Yet the United States has promised just $750 million over five years for Pakistan’s tribal areas, peanuts compared with what it is spending in Afghanistan. Substantial, targeted development funds by the United States and its allies are needed to bring the tribal areas up to par with the rest of Pakistan.

Pashtuns, moreover, are angry that their main province—the North-West Frontier Province—has no proper name. They’d like to rename it Pakhtunkhwa, land of Pakhtuns (or Pashtuns), just like Punjab for Punjabis, Sindh for Sindhis, and Baluchistan for Baluchis. Although economic development is crucial, greater provincial autonomy within Pakistan would address some of the Pashtuns’ concerns.

Be Careful What You Wish For - Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defense analyst based in Lahore.

Eliminating top al Qaeda leaders such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri via unilateral U.S. military action in Pakistan’s tribal areas will undoubtedly be viewed as a major triumph in Washington policy circles. But be careful what you wish for.

First, al Qaeda is now a symbol of resistance for a large number of shadowy, anti-American groups based in different countries that function independently of the organization’s central leadership. The decapitation of al Qaeda will be only a temporary setback for them.

Second, what if unilateral U.S. action in Pakistan’s tribal areas does not kill or capture the al Qaeda leadership? Failure will only further destabilize Pakistan’s fragile civilian elected government, which faces daunting domestic challenges and a powerful military whose current withdrawal from active politics is tactical rather than strategic.

Pakistan’s central predicament is not bin Laden per se, but the utter failure of former President Pervez Musharraf and the present leadership to mobilize the country against terrorism. Most Pakistanis think that their government’s involvement in the war on terror does not serve the national interest, and anti-U.S. sentiments go far beyond Islamic circles. Unilateral strikes will only fan those flames.

In short, getting bin Laden in a unilateral strike would hardly signal victory in the war on terrorism. The complex situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan requires a more comprehensive and long-range approach, involving supporting the civilian government in Islamabad, establishing a credible government in Kabul, and working jointly with the Pakistani military. Unilateral U.S. military action may or may not displace terrorist groups from the tribal areas in the short term, but it will certainly destabilize and fragment Pakistan in the long run. And nothing would make Osama bin Laden happier than seeing Pakistan become the next failed state.

Dry Up the Cesspool - Pervez Hoodbhoy
Pervez Hoodbhoy is chairman of the department of physics at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad and is a prominent commentator.

Seven years after 9/11, Osama bin Laden continues to elude the countless fortune seekers, professional spies, intelligence agencies, and Predators prowling the Afghan-Pakistani border. Ground operations have also revealed little. Pakistan’s recent offensive around the Taliban stronghold of Bajaur has so far produced more than 250,000 refugees and hundreds of dead Taliban and Arab fighters. The only new intel is that Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s second in command, recently visited the area with his wife. The GPS coordinates of al Qaeda’s top leader remain as fuzzy as ever.

But this may scarcely matter. Like Lewis Carol’s hotly pursued mythical Snark—who turned out to be just a Boojum at the end—bin Laden’s eventual capture or death, however satisfying, is likely to be irrelevant.

Al Qaeda has morphed into a mind-set, a way of thinking that transcends borders and individuals. The speed with which new militant leaders have succeeded slain ones stands as proof. Extremist organizations feed off ignorance, cruelty, misery, poverty, pain, and injustice. Their ranks are being swelled by those wrongfully or mistakenly targeted—the innocent victims of U.S., NATO, and Pakistani artillery and air power.

Even as al Qaeda and its Taliban allies spread their octopus arms into more and more areas of the North-West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), there is some good news. A people’s resistance is developing against atrocities targeting Shiites, massacres of tribal elders, destruction of girls’ schools and colleges, and the virtual elimination of revenues from areas dependent on tourism.

These gains need to be followed up. The cesspool in which extremism thrives must be drained. The Pakistani state must firmly enforce its writ and protect ordinary tribal folk who resist religious extremism. It will need to put more Pakistani boots on the ground in FATA, address the causes of human misery in these poverty-stricken and lawless no-man’s lands, and cleanse intelligence agencies of pro-Taliban and al Qaeda elements. It may be a tall order, but it is immensely more important than getting bin Laden’s head.

Related posts:

1. Bush Had No Plan to Catch Osama bin Laden This month's Economist announces the Terrorism Index for 2008, in...
2. I’m A Pakistani, Not a Terrorist I saw this online today about a protest by...
3. War on Terror?? Bushes and BCCI On April 4th, Lucy Komisar wrote this great piece on...

This month’s Economist announces the Terrorism Index for 2008, in which Pakistan is mentioned a few times. According to the report results, Pakistan is considered one the top nations to potential engage in the nuclear trade with terrorists, tied with North Korea, and the hands down winner on where the next al Qaeda stronghold will be.

Interesting when looking at it in the light of the Asia Times Online headline, Bush had no plan to catch Osama. Gareth Porter, an investigative journalists specializing in US national security policy, provides a very deep and disturbing look into the decision making process of the Bush administration and the hunt for Osama bin Laden.

According to the Asia Times Online story:

Top administration officials instead gave priority to planning for war with Iraq, leaving the United States with not nearly enough troops or strategic airlift capacity to close the large number of possible exit routes through the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area where Bin Laden escaped in late 2001.

Because it had not been directed to plan for that contingency, the US military was also forced to turn down an offer from then Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf in late November 2001 to send 60,000 troops to intercept the al-Qaeda leaders. As Northern Alliance troops marched on Kabul with little resistance in November 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency had intelligence that Bin Laden was headed for a cave complex in the Tora Bora Mountains close to the Pakistani border.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told a National Security Council meeting that Franks “wants the [Pakistanis] to close the transit points between Afghanistan and Pakistan to seal what’s going in and out”, according to the National Security Council meeting transcript in Bob Woodward’s book Bush at War.

Bush responded that they would need to “press Musharraf to do that”.

Then after realizing that the US military wasn’t up to the task of stopping bin Laden from getting into Pakistan, General Franks ended up in Islamabad:

A deputy to Franks, Lieutenant General Mike DeLong, later claimed that Musharraf had refused Franks’s request for regular Pakistani troops to be repositioned from the north to the border near the Tora Bora area. DeLong wrote in his 2004 book “Inside Centcom” that Musharraf had said he “couldn’t do that”, because it would spark a “civil war” with a hostile tribal population.

By the way, that civil war has started in Pakistan’s tribal areas and is spreading to our cities, did we say thank you for that?

But US ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, who accompanied Franks to the meeting with Musharraf, provided an account of the meeting to this writer that contradicts DeLong’s claim.

Chamberlin, now president of the Middle East Institute in Washington, recalled that the Pakistani president told Franks that CENTCOM had vastly underestimated what was required to block bin Laden’s exit from Afghanistan. Musharraf said, “Look you are missing the point: there are 150 valleys through which al-Qaeda are going to stream into Pakistan,” according to Chamberlin.

Although Musharraf admitted that the Pakistani government had never exercised control over the border area, the former diplomat recalled, he said this was “a good time to begin”. The Pakistani president offered to redeploy 60,000 troops to the area from the border with India but said his army would need airlift assistance from the United States.

But the Pakistani redeployment never happened, according to Lamm, because it wasn’t logistically feasible. Lamm recalled that it would have required an entire aviation brigade, including hundreds of helicopters, and hundreds of support troops to deliver that many combat troops to the border region - far more than was available.

So, now wait, I’m confused… you’re telling me that the US military doesn’t have the resources to assist the Pakistan Army in shifting forces from the India border to the Afghanistan border, and it’s our fault that America is losing the War on Terror? Pakistan is the most dangerous place in the world, not Iraq, I recall an international publication putting it.

When you are not serious about your accomplishing your mission, then can you really say “Mission Accomplished?”

Franks did get 1,200 marines inserted into the area, but they would not be enough to patrol the 1,500 kilometer border. The American military also realized, at this point, that local tribal leaders wouldn’t be willing to assist them either because bin Laden had given them “millions of dollars.”

The article damns the Bush administration:

Had the Bush administration’s priority been to capture or kill the al-Qaeda leadership, it would have deployed the necessary ground troops and airlift resources in the theater over a period of months before the offensive in Afghanistan began.

“You could have moved American troops along the Pakistani border before you went into Afghanistan,” said Lamm. But that would have meant waiting until spring 2002 to take the offensive against the Taliban, according to Lamm.

The views of Bush’s key advisers, however, ruled out any such plan from the start. During the summer of 2001 Rumsfeld refused to develop contingency plans for military action against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, despite a National Security Presidential Directive that called for such planning, according to the 9-11 Commission report.

Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz resisted such planning for Afghanistan because they were hoping that the White House would move quickly on military intervention in Iraq. According to the 9-11 Commission, at four deputies’ meetings on Iraq between May 31 and July 26, 2001, Wolfowitz pushed his idea to have US troops seize all the oil fields in southern Iraq.

Even after September 11, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Vice President Dick Cheney continued to resist any military engagement in Afghanistan, because they were hoping for war against Iraq instead.

….Lost in the eagerness to wrap up the Taliban and get on with the Iraq War was any possibility of preventing Bin Laden’s escape to Pakistan.

So let’s get this clear, the US military abandoned Afghanistan to chase Iraq’s petro-dollars. In the process, the Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were able to escape into Pakistan, because “we weren’t doing enough” over and over again.

Now, as the US presidential election nears, we are learning that it’s not Pakistan’s fault that the War on Terror has failed. It’s America, George Bush and Donald Rumsfeld.

Guess this wasn’t the October Surprise that McCain was looking for…

Related posts:

1. I’m A Pakistani, Not a Terrorist I saw this online today about a protest by...
2. Are Pakistan and the US on the Brink of War? As the United States steps up border raids into Pakistan,...
3. Pakistan Leaders Must Act Decisively after Deadly Marriott bombing - LA Times ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN -- More than any other terrorist attack in...

This is a long article, but very much worth the read if you want to see the US Military admit that they made a strategic mistake with their cross-border attacks into Pakistan.

U.S. special operations forces have paused ground operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas, but military and civilian government officials differ over why the cross-border raids have been halted.

The issue of U.S. raids into the tribal areas was thrust into the international spotlight by a Sept. 3 raid in Angor Adda, in the South Waziristan tribal agency, by Navy SEALs working for a Joint Special Operations Command task force. (JSOC is the secretive military organization that oversees the military’s special mission units such as the Army’s 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment–Delta and the Navy’s Naval Special Warfare Development Group, or DevGru, also known as SEAL Team 6.)

“We have shown a willingness starting this year to pursue those kinds of missions,” said a Pentagon official. However, he said, after temporarily granting JSOC greater latitude to conduct cross-border missions, U.S. leaders had decided to again restrain the command, at least as far as raids using ground troops are concerned, to allow Pakistani forces to press home their attacks on militants in the tribal areas.

“We are now working with the Pakistanis to make sure that those type of ground-type insertions do not happen, at least for a period of time to give them an opportunity to do what they claim they are desiring to do,” the Pentagon official said, adding that this did not apply to air strikes launched from unmanned aerial vehicles at targets inside the tribal areas.

Although JSOC is the organization tasked, along with the Central Intelligence Agency, with finding and killing or capturing al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Sept. 3 raid was not aimed at “a huge type of target,” the Pentagon official said. “There were just consistent problems in that area that had come to a point where there was significant evidence that there was complicity on the part of the [Pakistani military’s] Frontier Corps and others in allowing repetitive raids and activities to go on. And there was a firm desire to, one, send a message, and two, also establish any intelligence audit that could be established that would be useful to respond to a frequent question that we get from the other side of the border, which is, ‘Well, show us and tell us where the problem is, then we’ll deal with it.’”

But a U.S. government official closely involved with policy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region said the military had underestimated the Pakistani response and was reconsidering its options.

The official’s comments were echoed by a field grade special operations officer with Afghanistan experience. The Sept. 3 raid “was an opportunity to see how the new Pakistani government reacted,” the officer said. “If they didn’t do anything, they were just kind of fairly passive, like [former Pakistani President Pervez] Musharraf was … then we felt like, okay, we can slowly up the ante, we can do maybe some more of these ops. But the backlash that happened, and especially the backlash in the diplomatic channels, was pretty severe.”

The raid represented “a strategic miscalculation,” the U.S. government official said. “We did not fully appreciate the vehemence of the Pakistani response,” which included the Pakistan government’s implication that it was willing to cut the coalition’s supply lines through Pakistan. “I don’t think we really believed it was going to go to that level,” the government official said.

The military’s comments about the Sept. 3 raid sending a message represented a smokescreen, said the government official, who added that the mission “was meant to be the beginning of a campaign.” “We miscalculated, and now we’re trying to figure out how to walk the dog back. One way to do that is to say, ‘Oh well, we wanted to send a message; we’ve now sent that message, and so we’re going to not send it as much in the future, yet we’re still sort of leaving it on the table, because as we all know, we never admit to a mistake.’

“Once the Pakistanis started talking about closing down our supply routes, and actually demonstrated they could do it, once they started talking about shooting American helicopters, we obviously had to take seriously that maybe this [approach] was not going to be good enough,” the government official said. “We can’t sustain ourselves in Afghanistan without the Pakistani supply routes. At the end of the day, we had to not let our tactics get in the way of our strategy. … As much as it may be good to get some of these bad guys, we can’t do it at the expense of being able to sustain ourselves in Afghanistan, obviously.

“Senior uniformed people recognize that,” as do senior officials in the State Department and the intelligence agencies, the U.S. government official said. In the latter categories, the official said, “People are looking at this in terms of its propensity for destabilizing the situation in Pakistan and unifying all these disparate anti-this and anti-that elements into one anti-American element in Pakistan.”

“The raid got a lot more attention than they expected,” a Washington source in government said. “They do have to walk it back and go about it a different way, because obviously that didn’t work. … We can’t afford these backlashes every time a raid occurs.” However, the Washington source added, “I don’t think there’s been another strategic decision to back off.” Instead, JSOC would “go about it a different way.”

U.S. Central Command spokesman Rear Adm. Greg Smith declined to comment for this story.

Under questioning on Capitol Hill on Sept. 23, Defense Secretary Robert Gates did not deny that U.S. forces had made cross-border strikes.

“We will do what is necessary to protect our troops,” he said, acknowledging the Pentagon had been granted “authorities” for such action.
Into tribal areas

The Sept. 3 raid was not the first time JSOC forces have launched into the tribal areas. In the past, small JSOC elements have operated with the Pakistani Special Services Group in the tribal areas, and the special operations officer with Afghanistan experience said he was aware of “two or three” cross-border operations similar to the Angor Adda raid. “They have happened, but it was by no means a common occurrence,” he said.

However, said the government official closely involved with Afghanistan/Pakistan policy, JSOC “has been pushing hard for several years” to step up their raids into the tribal areas, said the U.S. government official closely involved with policy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. JSOC’s argument has been “Give us greater latitude, we’ve got to hit where their sanctuaries are,” the official said.

“In the wake of the increased Taliban attacks we’ve seen over the last several months and the sense of frustration that we haven’t been more successful, their point of view has finally gained traction,” the government official said.

Two government sources identified the Taliban’s July 13 attack on a U.S. outpost in the Korengal valley as a turning point in the debate.

“Clearly we saw what happened in the Korengal valley as a watershed moment,” said the government official closely involved with policy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Together with the Taliban’s July 7 bombing of the Indian embassy and their Jan. 14 attack on the Serena hotel (both in Kabul city) and the June 13 escape of an estimated 900 inmates, including perhaps 400 Taliban from a Kandahar jail, the Korengal fight gave the impression that things were spinning out of control.

“Suddenly you have an American outpost — not Canadian or British or Dutch — that is almost overrun,” the official said.
Busier op tempo, more targets

The Sept. 3 raid into Pakistan is part of a heightened operational tempo for JSOC forces based in Afghanistan, several sources said. JSOC’s target list has expanded from the original “big three” of bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and Taliban leader Mullah Omar to a broader list that includes figures in the Taliban-allied network of Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami group (sometimes referred to as HiG by the U.S. military).

The U.S. government official involved with policy in the area described JSOC’s targets as fitting into two categories: the “big guys” with whom the U.S. has “unfinished business” and “those people that threaten us operationally and tactically on the ground right now.”

Several sources said the Sept. 3 raid appeared to have been aimed at the Haqqani network, along with some of its Uzbek allies.

“Because of the nature of those types of operations, there generally has to be — and in this case there was — an involvement of a foreign fighter element,” the Pentagon official said. “And the traditional ones in that area are the Uzbeks and the Chechens. Their interpenetration with Talibs in that area is the mixture that is most at play.”

JSOC is “targeting a range of actors, but one of the big ones is Haqqani,” said a civilian expert on Afghanistan, adding that targeting the Haqqani network represented “payback” for its alleged involvement in the Indian embassy bombing, the hotel attack in Kabul and an assassination attempt against Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

The U.S. government official closely involved with policy in the region agreed that U.S. forces were targeting Haqqani as “payback,” but also because the network — now mostly controlled by Haqqani’s son, Sirajuddin — “is seen as … the low-hanging fruit,” because its bases in Waziristan are more easily accessible than the mountainous terrain of the Bajaur tribal agency where Hekmatyar’s fighters operate.

“None of the JSOC activity has been going on in the areas around the sanctuary for Mullah Omar’s Taliban,” which is located in and around the Pakistani city of Quetta, the civilian expert on Afghanistan said. “It’s all happening in the tribal areas… The target has not been the Omar Taliban.”

The government official closely involved with policy in the region agreed that the change in the rules of engagement that allowed JSOC to operate more freely across the border applied only to the tribal areas, and not to “Pakistan proper.”

As a result, he said “The cross-border activity, by virtue of where these target sets are located, favors actions against HiG and against the Haqqani network, and not against the Quetta Shura [of Mullah Omar].”

A senior military official said that the JSOC task force was using a similar approach along the border to that which served JSOC so well in Iraq: a combination of technical and human intelligence driving multiple missions per night, with each target quickly exploited for intelligence that then prompts further missions.

But the Taliban are not standing still, according to the government official involved with policy in the region. “Both sides have taken the gloves off and are going at it hard,” the official said.

The increased pace of operations has come with a significant cost: Three DevGru SEALs have died in Afghanistan in recent weeks: Petty Officer 1st Class Joshua Harris, who drowned while crossing a river Aug. 30, and Senior Chief Petty Officer John Wayne Marcum and Chief Petty Officer (select) Jason Richard Freiwald, who both died Sept. 12 of injuries suffered in combat Sept. 11.

The two DevGru casualties who died Sept. 12 were killed “on the Afghan side of the border in one of those small, minor ambush-type things,” the Pentagon official said.

When JSOC forces cross the border into Pakistan, they do so only after receiving clearances from the highest levels of the U.S. government, sources said. However, exactly who has the authority to approve JSOC’s missions into Pakistan is shrouded in secrecy.

Asked at what level JSOC’s cross-border missions must be authorized, the Pentagon official said he knew the answer, but added, “I can’t talk to you about that, given the level of classification.” However, he said, the authority rested far above the JSOC task force commander in Afghanistan.

“It’s long been that way,” the Pentagon official said. “That’s not done in a cavalier [way] or without a very high level of authority. … Neither the aerial-type missions nor the ground-type missions, short of hot pursuit, which has some very finite restrictions on it, can take place without there being a high level of authority.”

The Washington source in government said the issue’s sensitivity was related to diplomacy. “There’s a very linear chain of command … but it can make things diplomatically stressful if these things are made public,” the source said.

“Even a missile strike requires the highest level of authority,” a special operations officer with Afghanistan experience said.

Asked who would have to sign off on a mission into Pakistan, he replied: “The president, no doubt in my mind. The president.”

Courtesy: Army Times

Related posts:

1. The Long Road to Chaos in Pakistan Hours after a truck bomber slew 53 people last weekend...
2. Afghan Paper - US Inaction Against Pakistan Emboldens Insurgents Text of article in Dari entitled "Pakistan acts, America does...
3. Are Pakistan and the US on the Brink of War? As the United States steps up border raids into Pakistan,...

LONDON - U.S. Gen. David Petraeus warned Monday that combat in Afghanistan could intensify in the coming months as the United States and NATO allies aggressively take on Taliban fighters attempting to hide and gather strength in the rugged terrain over winter.

After talks in London with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Petraeus said more troops are needed in Afghanistan, where a rising number of extremist attacks has made this the most violent year since the U.S.-led invasion that ousted the Taliban regime.

“I think we will see a continuation of fighting through the winter season, perhaps a bit more than we have seen in the past,” he said.

American commanders are expecting to do more fighting in the coming winter because the U.S. discovered, after the fact, that the Taliban last winter managed to find safe haven inside Afghanistan. It put them in a better than anticipated position to carry out attacks in the spring. This time, the United States wants to be more aggressive in ferreting out the Taliban before the militants have a chance to regroup.

The remarks come only days after U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said the Pentagon could send more combat troops to Afghanistan starting in the spring — even though he cautioned against a military buildup in a country that has often repelled outside invaders.

Petraeus, who is widely credited with quelling insurgency in Iraq as the architect of the so-called troop “surge,” declined to say whether he believed Britain should send additional personnel to Afghanistan. Britain has around 8,000 soldiers there, mostly based in the violent southern Afghan province Helmand.

“This is a job for the NATO authorities, for the greater coalition and for national authorities,” Petraeus said, after his talks with Brown, Defense Secretary Des Browne and the head of Britain’s armed forces, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup.

Petraeus has recently been appointed as the new commander of U.S. Central Command, with responsibilities across the Middle East, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other Central Asian nations.

Petraeus, who takes a new posting as the overall head of U.S. forces in the Middle East on Oct. 31, said that the U.S. and other allies must support Pakistan in rooting out militancy.

“They clearly have a threat, the nature of which and the importance of which is increasingly being recognized in Islamabad,” Petraeus said. “This is in a sense an existential threat, a threat to Pakistan’s very existence.”

Courtesy: The Boston Globe

Related posts:

1. Are Pakistan and the US on the Brink of War? As the United States steps up border raids into Pakistan,...
2. Bush Had No Plan to Catch Osama bin Laden This month's Economist announces the Terrorism Index for 2008, in...
3. Spec ops raids into Pakistan halted - Army Times This is a long article, but very much worth the...

This morning’s Daily Times carried a stunning headline for Pakistanis. Asif Ali Zardari, to clarify “the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan” stated that ”Obviously, the world is a safer place,” he said. “It could have been worse,” in an interview with the Washington Post on Saturday. Can I ask which world Zardari is talking about?

If we look at it from Pakistan’s point of view, we are under attack both from internal and external forces. Our borders are regularly being violated by US military forces and our citizens are being targeted in terrorist attacks on our own soil. The international media has made Pakistan the reason for the US failure in Afghanistan because apparently the Soviet conflict never happened and the US never left Afghanistan in a lerch after using it to defeat the Soviet Union. Yet, Zardari feels that Bush has made the world a safer place.. interesting… did you hear the dollars transferring to offshore accounts there??

More interestingly, in the same interview, Zardari refuted the fact that Pakistani forces fired on the US military on their latest incursion into Pakistan. While Admiral Michael Mullen was confirming to the media that:

“There was a cross-border fire incident yesterday,” Mullen said, corroborating reports from U.S and NATO military officials. He urged both sides not to “overreact to the hair-trigger tension we are all feeling. Now, more than ever, is a time for teamwork, for calm.”

Another interesting thought….

Zardari also contributes the Marriott bombing to the “rise of the axis of evil”:

At the same time, Zardari warned that “the axis of evil is growing.” He cited last Saturday’s massive bombing at the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, which killed more than 50 people, and pressed the Bush administration to step up intelligence cooperation with Pakistan to help confront Islamist militants.

Zardari also announced a new initiative for Afghani farmers:

Zardari discussed a plan to persuade Afghan farmers to plant corn instead of opium to take advantage of rising prices sparked by the burgeoning U.S. ethanol industry. “We can try to grow corn in Afghanistan and give them the same returns they’re getting from opium,” he said.

Sadly, he has nothing to offer the people of Pakistan to feed their starving, nor any solutions to controlling the massive smuggling of wheat to Afghanistan and the Central Asia states.

Later, in the interview:

Zardari reaffirmed Pakistan’s position that it should take the lead in battling terrorism. “This side of the border is my problem,” Zardari said, adding that if U.S. forces need “permission of sorts” to cross the border, “we can have an understanding on that, but they haven’t asked for it.”

“If we need help, we call for them. If they need help, they call for us,” he added. If the United States has security concerns in Pakistan, “let us know. We’ll do it for them.”

Zardari said he welcomed U.S. support in bolstering his country’s ability to patrol Pakistan’s porous border with Afghanistan. He also appealed for help confronting an insurgency that has grown increasingly bold in recent months.

“They keep coming up with new ways of war,” he said referring to the Marriott Hotel attack. “Obviously, the problem has not gone away, so the medicine needs to be enhanced.”

I found an interesting post on a blog about the Iraq War which sheds some more light on the “safety” that George W. Bush has given the people of Iraq.

One more thing… not to forget the historic meeting between President Zardari and Alaska Governor Sarah Palin, Zardari is quoted in another Washington Post article saying:

Pakistan’s new president, Asif Ali Zardari, said that he thought Palin was “very nice” and that she was “quite knowledgeable” about the threat of terror posed by Islamist extremists along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan. “She is obviously a hunting lady,” he said, suggesting it was a useful qualification for understanding Pakistan’s complex security challenges.

Zardari said that he was impressed by Palin’s strategy for developing oil reserves in Alaska and that she had done a good job ensuring that revenues flowed to local communities. He said he was considering a similar approach to exploiting natural resources in Pakistan.

“I’ve been promoting the Alaska model to some extent in Pakistan,” Zardari said. At that stage, a senior aide interrupted the Pakistani leader. “The president also spoke to Joseph Biden,” he said. Zardari said that Biden has been instrumental in steering hundred of millions of U.S. dollars to Pakistan to shore up democracy. “He has been a great friend of democracy from the first day,” Zardari added.

Sarah Palin “quite knowledgeable” on the threat of terror posed by Islamist extremists along the Pakistan border with Afghanistan… should we take that to mean that Zardari also has no clue about what is going on the border with Afghanistan? The US media has made it very clear to their voters that Palin has no idea about Pakistan, the War on Terror or Extremism, no foreign policy experience seems to be the regular chorus from the media. Yet, somehow Pakistan’s President Zardari thinks she’s “quite knowledgeable” on Pakistan… guess that comes from his months of foreign policy experience.

Actually, let’s hear it from Sarah Palin herself:

Palin’s apparent disagreement with McCain’s position on Pakistan came as the Alaska governor was picking up a couple of cheesesteaks at Tony Luke’s in South Philadelphia. She was approached by a man wearing a Temple University t-shirt, who later identified himself as Michael Rovito. 

“How about the Pakistan situation?” Rovito asked. “What’s your thoughts about that.” 

“In Pakistan?” Palin responded. 

“What’s going on over there, like Waziristian?” 

“It’s working with Zardari to make sure that we’re all working together to stop the guys from coming in over the border,” Palin said. “And we’ll go from there.” 

“Waziristan is blowing up,” Rovito replied. 

“Yeah, it is,” Palin said. “And the economy there is blowing up, too.” 

“So we do cross-border, like from Afghanistan to Pakistan, you think?” Rovito asked. 

“If that’s what we have to do stop the terrorists from coming any further in, absolutely, we should,” Palin said.

God help us.

Related posts:

1. Islamabad Bombing Shakes Pakistan - Eric Margolis The one ton truck bomb that ripped apart Islamabad's Marriot...
2. Is Pakistan’s New President Up to the Job? Henry Chu has recently done a series of articles on...
3. Choosing Your Friends: Pakistan, The US and China While Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari is in the United...

A new WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of 17 nations finds that majorities in only nine of them believe that al Qaeda was behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States.

In no country does a majority agree on another possible perpetrator, but in most countries significant minorities cite the US government itself and, in a few countries, Israel. These responses were given spontaneously to an open-ended question that did not offer response options.

On average, 46 percent say that al Qaeda was behind the attacks while 15 percent say the US government, seven percent Israel, and seven percent some other perpetrator. One in four say they do not know.

Given the extraordinary impact the 9/11 attacks have had on world affairs, it is remarkable that seven years later there is no international consensus about who was behind them,” comments Steven Kull, director of WorldPublicOpinion.org.

Even in European countries, the majorities that say al Qaeda was behind 9/11 are not overwhelming. Fifty-seven percent of Britons, 56 percent of Italians, 63 percent of French and 64 percent of Germans cite al Qaeda.” However, significant portions of Britons (26%), French (23%), and Italians (21%) say they do not know who was behind 9/11. Remarkably, 23 percent of Germans cite the US government, as do 15 percent of Italians.

Publics in the Middle East are especially likely to name a perpetrator other than al Qaeda. In Egypt 43 percent say that Israel was behind the attacks, as do 31 percent in Jordan and 19 percent in the Palestinian Territories. The US government is named by 36 percent of Turks and 27 percent of Palestinians. The numbers who say al Qaeda was behind the attacks range from 11 percent in Jordan to 42 percent in the Palestinian Territories.

The only countries with overwhelming majorities citing al Qaeda are the African countries: Kenya (77%) and Nigeria (71%). In Nigeria, a large majority of Muslims (64%) also say that al Qaeda was behind the attacks (compared to 79% of Nigerian Christians).

The poll of 16,063 respondents was conducted between July 15 and August 31, 2008 by WorldPublicOpinion.org, a collaborative research project involving research centers from around the world and managed by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland. Margins of error range from +/-3 to 4 percent.

Interviews were conducted in 17 nations, including most of the largest nations–China, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Russia–as well as Egypt, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Mexico, the Palestinian Territories, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and the Ukraine.

Respondents were asked “Who do you think was behind the 9/11 attacks?” and their answers were categorized into four response groups: “Al Qaeda,” “the US government,” Israel,” or “Other.” Any answers that approximated al Qaeda, such as “bin Laden” or “Islamic extremists,” were categorized along with those who said al Qaeda. Those who simply characterized the perpetrators as “Arabs,” “Saudis,” or “Egyptians” (3% on average) were included in the “Other” category.

Respondents in Asia have mixed responses. Bare majorities in Taiwan (53%) and South Korea (51%) name al Qaeda, but 17 percent of South Koreans point to the US government and large numbers in both countries say they do not know (Taiwan 34%, South Korea 22%).

Majorities of Chinese (56%) and Indonesians (57%) say they do not know, with significant minorities citing the US government (Indonesia 14%, China 9%).

A clear majority of Russians (57%) and a plurality of Ukrainians (42%) say al Qaeda was behind the attacks. But significant minorities identify the US government (15% in both cases) and large numbers do not provide an answer (Ukrainians 39%, Russians 19%).

Out of all countries polled, Mexico has the second-largest number citing the US government as the perpetrator of 9/11 (30%, after Turkey at 36%). Only 33 percent name al Qaeda.

Though people with greater education generally have greater exposure to news, those with greater education are only slightly more likely to attribute 9/11 to al Qaeda. Steven Kull comments, “It does not appear that these beliefs can simply be attributed to a lack of exposure to information.”

A stronger correlate of beliefs about 9/11 are respondents’ attitudes about the United States. Those with a positive view of America’s influence in the world are more likely to cite al Qaeda (on average 59%) than those with a negative view (40%). Those with a positive view of the United States are also less likely to blame the US government (7%) than those with a negative view (22%).

Related posts:

1. Invade and Conquer – The New American Foreign Policy in the Middle East I was sitting in the office this afternoon with the...
2. Israel Should Quit Nearly All Occupied Land - Olmert JERUSALEM (Reuters) - Israel should withdraw from nearly all territory...
3. Hamas Phenomenon and Pakistan - Muhammad Ali Siddiqi THE rise of Hamas as a political force in Palestine...

“Your words have been very strong about Pakistan’s sovereign right and sovereign duty to protect your country, and the United States wants to help,” President Bush said before the meeting with Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari.

In the last 20 minutes, sources out of the tribal region of Pakistan are reporting that a US spy plane has been shot down by the local tribes in Angora Adda, the scene of the US military incursion in the past week. Details are still pending….

Thank you President Bush for your assistance, I think that Pakistan can take care of America’s regular double-speak without any assistance.

Updated at: 0031 PST,  Wednesday, September 24, 2008
 ANGOOR ADDA: Local tribes have shot down a U.S. drone here on Tuesday, according to Geo News. 

The wreckages of the devastated U.S. drone was reportedly scattered in Village Jallalabad near Angoora Adda, sources said.

ISPR sources have not confirmed the annihilation of U.S. spy plane. While the security forces have reportedly taken the wreckage under control.

Related posts:

1. Afghan Paper - US Inaction Against Pakistan Emboldens Insurgents Text of article in Dari entitled "Pakistan acts, America does...
2. Spec ops raids into Pakistan halted - Army Times This is a long article, but very much worth the...
3. Why Would ‘Terrorists’ Want To Decapitate Anti-US Leadership In Pakistan? - Paul Joesph Watson After several weeks of international bad press because of drone...

ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN — More than any other terrorist attack in this volatile country, the devastating truck bombing of the Marriott Hotel over the weekend has presented government and military leaders here with a stark choice: Go all out against extremists or risk the nation’s collapse into chaos.

That is the growing consensus among many Pakistani analysts and commentators, who fear that without rapid, determined and ironfisted action by officials and security forces, this nuclear-armed land is in danger of becoming a failed state, with Islamic radicals in control.

On Monday, the government described just how close those militants may have come to dealing Pakistan an almost fatal blow. A senior official said that President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yusaf Raza Gilani and top Cabinet members were supposed to dine together at the Marriott on Saturday night — but switched venues just before the bombing.

“At the eleventh hour, the president and prime minister decided that the venue would be the prime minister’s house,” Rehman Malik, the Interior Ministry’s top official, told reporters. “It saved the entire leadership.”

Malik did not explain what inspired the change in plans. A representative of the hotel later cast doubt on the statement, telling the Associated Press that there were no plans for a government dinner at the Marriott on Saturday.

Malik’s disclosure, if true, betrayed the alarming extent to which militants have beefed up their intelligence capabilities and upgraded their planning and operations accordingly. Local media reported that Gilani would hold an emergency meeting today to discuss tightening security to prevent more attacks like Saturday’s.

The suicide bombing of the Marriott, an icon of social and political wheeling and dealing here in the Pakistani capital, killed 53 people, including at least two Americans, and wounded more than 250.

The U.S. Central Command on Monday identified one of the slain Americans as Air Force Maj. Rodolfo I. Rodriguez, 34, of El Paso. The name of the other had not yet been released.

Robert S. Prucha, deputy director of public affairs for the Central Command, said a number of other members of the U.S. military were at the hotel and suffered minor scrapes and cuts. None required hospitalization, he said.

No verifiable claim of responsibility has surfaced, although a shadowy group called Fedayeen Islam told Al Arabiya television that it was behind the attack. From the ferocity and size of the bombing, suspicion has fallen on Al Qaeda and a movement known as the Pakistani Taliban.

The descent into violence and fear here has been sharp.

In a country where suicide bombings were relatively rare five years ago, more than 300 people have been killed in such attacks this year. What seemed at first to be a threat confined to the nation’s fringes, in the rugged and uncontrollable border and tribal areas, has now penetrated urban centers, including the very heart of this leafy, broad-avenued capital.

The violence gripping the nation continued Monday with the kidnapping of a top foreign diplomat in the city of Peshawar, in Pakistan’s tribal belt.

Abdul Khaliq Farahi, the Afghan consul general there, who was to become Kabul’s ambassador to Islamabad in the next few days, was abducted on his way home from the consulate Monday afternoon by gunmen who shot and killed his driver. No word has been received from the kidnappers, said Majnoon Gulab, the deputy Afghan ambassador.

In recent weeks, the Pakistani army has stepped up its campaign against militancy in mountainous areas near the border with Afghanistan, such as in the Bajaur region, and in the Swat valley. The military says it has inflicted severe losses on the extremists, including a dozen who were killed in Swat on Monday. At the same time, a suicide bombing killed eight people in the area.

The bombing of the Marriott may have been in retaliation for the military campaign, as well as a general strike against the government of Zardari, the newly elected president and widower of assassinated former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Zardari had delivered his maiden address to lawmakers just hours before.

But he and his predecessor, Pervez Musharraf, have also shown a willingness to negotiate and declare truces with insurgents, perhaps in a nod to the many Pakistanis who denounce the government for targeting its own people and who view the crackdown as America’s proxy war.

The attack on the Marriott, most of whose victims were Pakistanis, and the fact that it may have been a mass assassination attempt ought to remove any doubt in the minds of the public and dissenting officials that the country is facing an existential threat, said analyst Mahmood Shah, a retired general who was head of security in the militant-ridden tribal areas.

“There is no more room for any wavering. There is no more time left,” Shah said. “These extremists want to capture power in Pakistan. . . . There shouldn’t be any soft-pedaling of this whole issue.”

Analysts say the government must create a comprehensive strategy for pacifying Pakistan’s tribal belt — not just militarily, but with economic incentives and measures for installing a government in what is a largely lawless place.

“The military operation is not an end in itself. You seize territory, but you have to make sure you know what you want to achieve there,” said analyst Talat Masood, also a retired general. “As of now, there seems to be a lot of ambiguity as to what they want to achieve.

“Naturally, you want a political engagement with those who are prepared to work with the government, and you need to reestablish the writ of the state. Like in Bajaur, where we are fighting now: Are you genuinely doing that, or is it just talk?” Masood said. “It has to be sustained over a period of not days, months, but years.”

He and others acknowledge that opponents of striking hard against extremism have succeeded in portraying the fight as one of Washington’s making, carried out by an all-too-pliant Pakistani government. That sentiment can be heard not just in tea shops and living rooms, but also in the barracks, among Pakistan’s junior officers and troops.

“Their thinking is that this is an American war, at least some of them,” Masood said. “For the military, it’s a very difficult task to fight your own people. And for the military to fight counterinsurgency is the worst, because they’re not trained for that.”

The News, one of Pakistan’s biggest English-language newspapers, said in an editorial Monday: “We must wake up to the fact that these people come from amongst us; they target venues within the country and they kill their own countrymen.

“It is time we accepted this war is our own. . . . There must be a consensus across society about the need to act with unity and determination to save what still remains of our wounded country,” it said.

Just days into his presidency, Zardari is under pressure from all sides to try to make Pakistan more secure. Some voices still blame the government for working so closely with the United States and provoking a backlash from Islamic radicals; others accuse the government of dithering and not cracking down hard enough.

“The great fear is that Pakistan is past the point of no return when it comes to being able to cope with these threats from within,” said Stephen Cohen, an expert on South Asia at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “When you look at other countries with these kinds of movements, it’s a long battle, a 10- to 15-year battle.”

Zardari is to meet with President Bush in New York today for a previously scheduled talk on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meeting.

They are expected to discuss recent incursions by U.S. troops into Pakistan from Afghanistan, which Zardari and other officials say violate Pakistan’s sovereignty.

The bombing of the Marriott has cast a shadow over the meeting, and over all of Pakistan, which now must fully commit to stamping out extremism within its borders, said analyst Masood.

“It was a wake-up call for the [entire] country,” he said. “It was an extraordinary explosion, in the sense that it was so severe, and I have a feeling that if they haven’t even woken up after this, then God alone knows when they will.”

Henry Chu is a staff writer with the LA Times and can be reached at henry.chu@latimes.com

Times staff writer Julian E. Barnes in Washington contributed to this report.

Courtesy: The Los Angeles Times

Related posts:

1. The Intelligence Intrigues that Preceded the Islamabad Bomb - Brig-Gen Shaukat Qadir Whenever the terrorists succeed, whenever an atrocity is of a...
2. Asif Zardari on CNN Late Edition Let's see how many times the story has changed about...
3. Islamabad Bombing Shakes Pakistan - Eric Margolis The one ton truck bomb that ripped apart Islamabad's Marriot...