Behind the Chairman’s Door

Whenever the terrorists succeed, whenever an atrocity is of a scale to hit the front pages of the world’s newspapers, there is always an inquest into the failures of intelligence that allowed it to happen.

After the slaughter at the Marriott hotel in Islamabad on Saturday, the intelligence agencies of a dozen or more countries will be re-analysing the information and the intercepts of recent weeks to see if there was anything they missed, anything they misinterpreted. And nowhere more so than in Pakistan.

However, the post-mortem in Islamabad is likely to have deeper political implications. The lead agency concerned is Pakistan’s premier intelligence organisation, the Inter Services Intelligence, ISI. For them, the bombing could not have come at a worse time. It has been under criticism for a number of years and even before the bombing was facing demands from the US that it be restructured. After the installation of the new president, Asif Ali Zardari, there was feverish speculation that he would sack its Director General.

During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the CIA worked hand in glove with the ISI, funnelling billions of dollars in cash and weapons through it to the Afghan resistance groups. After the Soviet withdrawal, followed by the US abandonment of Afghanistan, the ISI had no control over the anarchy that ensued until the Taliban entered the fray in 1994, bringing some sort of peace in their wake – at least until 1996, when they fell under the influence of Osama bin Laden.

Throughout this period, the CIA continued close collaboration with the ISI, referring to it as “amongst the most efficient and well organised intelligence organisations in the world” and as “our closest and most reliable partner”. In private, it went so far as to acknowledge that it received greater cooperation from the ISI than it did from Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency.
During this period, the ISI was the sole actor supporting – and participating in – the Afghan jihad, and also the principal one involved in the originally indigenous uprising in Indian-administered Kashmir. Consequently, a large percentage of its officers – from the senior to the most junior – became infused with admiration for the courage and conviction of the Mujahids. Some became ardent Islamists, believers in the concept of and necessity for jihad, whether in Afghanistan, Kashmir, or elsewhere in the world.

Consequently when, after 9/11, the Pakistan government decided to reverse its policy first of supporting the Taliban and then of supporting the militancy in Kashmir, a large number of ISI personnel felt betrayed. The chief among these was the agency’s incumbent Director General, Lt Gen Mahmood Ahmed, who even attempted, successfully on occasions, to subvert the express commands of President Pervez Musharraf.

There were accusations – justified – during this time that the ISI contained rogue elements, but in October 2001 Mahmood Ahmed was sacked and Gen Ehsan ul Haq took over with the principal task of purging the organisation. He was succeeded by Gen Pervez Kiyani, now the Pakistan army chief of staff (COAS), who completed the process. There are now no rogue or pro-jihad elements left in the ISI.

There is, however, one astounding reality; seven months after the new government came to power, even after it forced the departure of President Musharraf, Lt Gen Nadeem Taj, a known Musharraf loyalist, continues to remain the DG of the ISI.

Since it would be unfair to underestimate President Zardari, it is highly unlikely that this controversial retention is an oversight; more likely is that it is Zardari’s attempt to balance the possible political power of the COAS.

In my previous article, “Pakistan stands up to the US: and shows how to win the war” (Sept 17), I explained how Gen Kiyani had, in all likelihood, forced the hand of the political leadership into taking a tougher stance on US incursions across the border from Afghanistan. Gen Kiyani has been at pains to demonstrate that he has no intention of interfering in the fledgling political process in Pakistan, but will be quite prepared to exert pressure in issues relating to the war on terrorism.

With a DG ISI enjoying authority only at the whim of Zardari, the president has found a possible loyalist to counter the increasingly popular army chief, and even pose some kind of a threat to him.

So what restructuring of the ISI does the US expect from Pakistan’s political leaders? While a symbolic sacking of the DG might suffice for the present, that does not seem to suit President Zardari. If it did, it would have been carried out before the Islamabad bombing at the stage when the US accused the ISI of complicity in bombing the Indian embassy in Afghanistan.

It all really boils down to the one fact: since the US is not prepared to accept that it is fast losing control in Afghanistan, it is blaming Pakistan for exporting unrest across the border. In such a mindset, it seems unfathomable to the Americans that an efficient organisation like the ISI is not reducing the insurgency considerably; therefore the ISI has to be complicit and must be restructured.

When incidents such as the occupation of the Red Mosque last year and the suicide attack at the Marriott are analysed, it is undoubtedly the case that the entire intelligence and security system in Pakistan needs revamping – but not the way the Americans are asking for it.

Brig-Gen Shaukat Qadir is a retired Pakistan army infantry officer.

Courtesy: The National

Share and Enjoy: