Extremism

Problem, Not Solution - Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi

By Khalid ⋅ July 22, 2007 ⋅  Print this post ⋅ Post a comment

Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, a noted defense and political analyst in Pakistan, shared an interesting insight into Pakistan’s extremist problem in today’s Daily Times.

The military is drawing flak for its expanded role in the political and other non-professional domains. The intensity of anti-army feeling and the frequency of its expression are unprecedented in post-1971 Pakistan.

The slogans and banners of the lawyers’ protest movement demanded time and again that the top commanders of the army return to the barracks. Some protesters were seen burning General Pervez Musharraf’s effigy in army uniform. A movement-song calling for army’s return has been doing the rounds recently. State authorities have registered cases against several lawyers or arrested them for displaying anti-military slogans. This did not deter them. However, the criticism has been aimed at the political role of the top brass of the army rather than the military as an institution or profession.

Anti-army sentiments are also conspicuous in the latest wave of suicide-bombings, targeting army and paramilitary personnel and police. The security of security personnel was never such a major issue in the past. They generally enjoyed respect in society, which appears to have dwindled since the beginning of the judicial crisis. The military in general and the army in particular also face criticism for business and commercial activities, which has shown unprecedented expansion during the Musharraf years.

The army is criticised and its personnel attacked by suicide bombers because it is viewed as the mainstay of the Musharraf government, whose recent policies have totally alienated Islamic and other groups.

Four features of the current situation need attention. First, societal groups, especially Islamists, are not unanimous in condemning the recent suicide attacks on security personnel. Second, even if these attacks represent a reaction to the Red Mosque incident, the suicide bombers could not have been ready for action within a day or so unless they were already present and prepared in the tribal areas and the adjacent districts. Third, government circles appear divided on firmly stemming extremism and militancy. Fourth, Islamic parties and groups maintain a distance from Islamic militants but sympathise with their causes.

Though Pakistan’s citizens have expressed deep concern over the recent spate of suicide bombings in various parts of Pakistan, they are not unanimous in categorical condemnation of specific incidents. They argue that the government’s pro-United States policy in Afghanistan, the Red Mosque incident, and the refusal to introduce a genuinely Islamic system are the main causes of suicide bombings.

The Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and other Islamic parties and groups are extremely critical of the military action against the Red Mosque. Their narratives complain about the excessive use of force and refusal of the government to give safe passage to those inmates of the mosque who were willing to leave. The latter claim is not confirmed by any other source.

The MMA and other Islamic groups also claim that several hundred people (including children and women) were killed in Red Mosque and that the government buried most of them quietly in order to claim fewer deaths. These groups do not give any credence to the argument that the state cannot allow groups and movements to challenge its writ. They also refuse to explain their unwillingness to mediate the conflict between the government and the Red Mosque leadership when the latter began to defy the state authorities in January 2007. They stayed away to see how far the Red Mosque leadership would go with the self-ascribed mission of enforcing Islamic laws.

Islamic political parties oppose military action against the Red Mosque to show solidarity with hard-line Islamic movements and to deter the government from taking similar action in future. They also want to protect the political space made available to them by the government in the past.

These incidents confirm reports from international sources and Pakistan’s independent analysts that the tribal areas, especially northern and southern Waziristan, continue to be safe havens for extremists and Al Qaeda-type radical elements. This also exposes official claims that the military action in the tribal areas (2003-2006) was a success and that the September 2006 peace agreement with the tribal leaders contained militancy. The recent escalation of violence represents a failure of government policy on controlling extremism and militancy.

Islamic extremists and militant elements have also benefited from the lack of official unanimity in dealing with them. Some elements in the government have generally viewed them as friends because they counteract the mainstream and centrist political forces that openly challenge the legitimacy of the Musharraf government. Others view them as a problem rather than an adversary, often ignoring their activities. Take the example of the Red Mosque militants, who were allowed to terrorise ordinary citizens until they kidnapped some Chinese.

The recent stepped-up violence is now threatening the Musharraf government and forcing top leaders to come to the conclusion that they can no longer ignore militant activities. These developments have also reduced the clout the sympathisers of militant Islamic groups have in official circles, at least for the time being.

The government faces two major problems in devising concrete policy measures to check the violence. First, the Musharraf government is more isolated now than ever. The political right and Islamic elements have either distanced them from it or openly oppose it. The extremist and militant elements have decided to hit the government as hard as possible. These elements may not be able to sustain the frequency and intensity of suicide bombings for a long time, but they have already undermined the credibility of the government.

Second, the restoration of the chief justice by the Supreme Court on July 20, coupled with the protest movement by lawyers, societal groups and political parties has eroded the moral basis of General Musharraf’s authority. This undermines his capacity to mobilise support for his policies.

Musharraf’s appeal to the people “to stand united against the extremists” is not going to win many supporters, mainly because he no longer enjoys credibility with liberal and moderate political circles. Musharraf is seeking their support to sustain his rule rather than re-arrange the power structure in Islamabad on liberal and democratic lines.

The crux of the problem is that Musharraf views his rule as a pre-requisite for addressing internal threats. The opposition political forces and independent observers view him as part of the problem and expect no significant improvement in Pakistan’s domestic situation as long as he retains his plans to contest elections for another term. His position has become more untenable after the Supreme Court judgment.

Tags: al qaeda, army, Extremism, hasan askari rizvi, jihadi, MMA, Musharraf, Pakistan, religious parties, Taliban, waziristan